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When an individual within such a small society violates this rule, the others are aware of it and exclude the offender from their cooperative activities. Once the convention is in place, justice of this sort is defined as conformity with the convention, injustice as violation of it; indeed, the convention defines property rights, ownership, financial obligation, theft, and related concepts, which had no application before the convention was introduced.

So useful and obvious is this invention that human beings would not live for long in isolated family groups or in fluctuating larger groups with unstable possession of goods; their ingenuity would quickly enable them to invent property, so as to reap the substantial economic benefits of cooperation in larger groups in which there would be reliable possession of the product, and they would thus better satisfy their powerful natural greed by regulating it with rules of justice.

Greed, and more broadly, self-interest, is the motive for inventing property; but we need a further explanation why we think of justice adherence to the rules of ownership as virtuous, and injustice their violation as vicious. Hume accounts for the moralization of property as follows. As our society grows larger, we may cease to see our own property violations as a threat to the continued existence of a stable economic community, and this reduces our incentive to conform. But when we consider violations by others, we partake by sympathy in the uneasiness these violations cause to their victims and all of society.

Such disinterested uneasiness, and the concomitant pleasure we feel on contemplating the public benefits of adherence, are instances of moral disapproval and approval. We extend these feelings to our own behavior as a result of general rules. Private education assists in this further artifice. Thus material honesty becomes a virtue. Does this account resolve the circularity problem? Is there any non-moral motive of honest action? Some interpreters say yes, it is greed redirected, which removes the circle. But this presents two difficulties: first, our greed is not in fact best satisfied by just action in every case, and second, Hume denies that this motive is approved.

Some interpret Hume as coping with the first difficulty by supposing that politicians and parents deceive us into thinking, falsely, that every individual just act advances the interests of the agent; or they claim that Hume himself mistakenly thought so, at least in the Treatise see Baron, Haakonssen, and Gauthier.

Others claim that Hume identifies a non-moral motive of honest action albeit an artificial one other than redirected greed, such as a disposition to treat the rules of justice as themselves reason-giving Darwall or having a policy of conforming to the rules of justice as a system Garrett. Still others say there is no non-moral motive of honest action, and Hume escapes from the circle by relaxing this ostensibly universal requirement on virtuous types of behavior, limiting it to the naturally virtuous kinds. These interpreters either claim that there is no particular motive needed to evoke approval for conformity to the rules of property — mere behavior is enough Mackie — or that we approve of a motivating form of the moral sentiment itself, the sense of duty Cohon.

Fidelity is the virtue of being disposed to fulfill promises and contracts. While he identifies the same circularity puzzle about the approved motive of fidelity that he tackles at length in connection with honesty, in the case of fidelity he concentrates on a different conundrum that arises with the misguided attempt to analyze fidelity as a non-conventional natural virtue.

Suppose the practice of giving and receiving promises did not depend on a socially-defined convention. In that case, what could we mean by the utterances we use to make them, and what would be the origin of our obligation to fulfill them? The requisite mental act or mental state, though, could not be one of mere desire or resolution to act, since it does not follow from our desiring or resolving to act that we are morally obligated to do so; nor could it be the volition to act, since that does not come into being ahead of time when we promise, but only when the time comes to act.

And of course, one can promise successfully incur obligation by promising even though one has no intention to perform; so the mental act requisite to obligation is not the intention to perform. The only likely act of mind that might be expressed in a promise is a mental act of willing to be obligated to perform the promised action, as this conforms to our common view that we bind ourselves by choosing to be bound. But, Hume argues, it is absurd to think that one can actually bring an obligation into existence by willing to be obligated. What makes an action obligatory is that its omission is disapproved by unbiased observers.

But no act of will within an agent can directly change a previously neutral act into one that provokes moral disapproval in observers even in the agent herself. Sentiments are not subject to such voluntary control. Thus, there is no such act of the mind. Since the necessary condition for a natural obligation of promises cannot be fulfilled, we may conclude that this obligation is instead the product of group invention to serve the interests of society. Promises are invented in order to build upon the advantages afforded by property. The invention of mere ownership suffices to make possession stable.

The introduction of transfer by consent permits some trade, but so far only simultaneous swapping of visible commodities. Great advantages could be gained by all if people could be counted on to provide goods or services later for benefits given now, or exchange goods that are distant or described generically.

But for people without the capacity to obligate themselves to future action, such exchanges would depend upon the party who performs second doing so out of gratitude alone; and that motive cannot generally be relied on in self-interested transactions. First, people can easily recognize that additional kinds of mutual exchanges would serve their interests. They need only express this interest to one another in order to encourage everyone to invent and to keep such agreements. They devise a form of words to mark these new sorts of exchanges and distinguish them from the generous reciprocal acts of friendship and gratitude.

But Hume says the sentiment of morals comes to play the same role in promise-keeping that it does in the development of honesty with respect to property T 3. This may provide a moral motive for promise-keeping even in anonymous transactions. A small society can maintain a subsistence-level economy without any dominion of some people over others, relying entirely on voluntary compliance with conventions of ownership, transfer of goods, and keeping of agreements, and relying on exclusion as the sole means of enforcement.

Though people are aware that injustice is destructive of social cooperation and so ultimately detrimental to their own interests, this knowledge will not enable them to resist such strong temptation, because of an inherent human weakness: we are more powerfully drawn to a near-term good even when we know we will pay for it with the loss of a greater long-term good. This is the reason for the invention of government. Once in power, rulers can also make legitimate use of their authority to resolve disputes over just what the rules of justice require in particular cases, and to carry out projects for the common good such as building roads and dredging harbors.

Hume thinks it unnecessary to prove that allegiance to government is the product of convention and not mere nature, since governments are obviously social creations. But he does need to explain the creation of governments and how they solve the problem he describes. He speculates that people who are unaccustomed to subordination in daily life might draw the idea for government from their experience of wars with other societies, when they must appoint a temporary commander.


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This cannot be done with respect to all the people, but it can be done for a few. Perhaps more directly, they stand to lose their favored status if they are found by the people not to enforce the rules of justice. It is possible for the people to agree to appoint magistrates in spite of the incurable human attraction to the proximal good even when smaller than a remote good, because this predilection only takes effect when the lesser good is immediately at hand. When considering two future goods, people always prefer the greater, and make decisions accordingly. So looking to the future, people can decide now to empower magistrates to force them to conform to the rules of justice in the time to come so as to preserve society.

When the time comes to obey and individuals are tempted to violate the rules, the long-range threat this poses to society may not move them to desist, but the immediate threat of punishment by the magistrates will. We initially obey our magistrates from self-interest. But once government is instituted, we come to have a moral obligation to obey our governors; this is another artificial duty that needs to be explained.

Governors merely insure that the rules of justice are generally obeyed in the sort of society where purely voluntary conventions would otherwise break down. As in the case of fidelity to promises, the character trait of allegiance to our governors generates sympathy with its beneficiaries throughout society, making us approve the trait as a virtue. Rulers thus need not be chosen by the people in order to be legitimate. Consequently, who is the ruler will often be a matter of salience and imaginative association; and it will be no ground for legitimate rebellion that a ruler was selected arbitrarily.

Rulers identified by long possession of authority, present possession, conquest, succession, or positive law will be suitably salient and so legitimate, provided their rule tends to the common good. Although governments exist to serve the interests of their people, changing magistrates and forms of government for the sake of small advantages to the public would yield disorder and upheaval, defeating the purpose of government; so our duty of allegiance forbids this.

A government that maintains conditions preferable to what they would be without it retains its legitimacy and may not rightly be overthrown. But rebellion against a cruel tyranny is no violation of our duty of allegiance, and may rightly be undertaken. Hume does advocate some forms of government as being preferable to others, particularly in his Essays. He defends his preferences by arguing that certain forms of government are less prone to corruption, faction with the concomitant threat of civil war , and oppressive treatment of the people than others; that is, they are more likely to enforce the rules of justice, adjudicate fairly, and encourage peace and prosperity.

Hume famously criticizes the social contract theory of political obligation. According to his own theory, our duty to obey our governors is not reducible to an instance of our duty to fulfill promises, but arises separately though in a way parallel to the genesis of that duty.

Hume denies that any native citizen or subject in his own day has made even a tacit promise to obey the government, given that citizens do not think they did any such thing, but rather think they are born to obey it. Even a tacit contract requires that the will be engaged, and we have no memory of this; nor do governments refrain from punishing disloyalty in citizens who have given no tacit promise. The mechanism of sympathy ultimately accounts for this approval and the corresponding disapproval of the natural vices.

Sympathy also explains our approval of the artificial virtues; the difference is that we approve of those as a result of sympathy with the cumulative effects produced by the general practice of the artificial virtues on the whole of society individual acts of justice not always producing pleasure for anyone ; whereas we approve each individual exercise of such natural virtues as gratitude and friendship because we sympathize with those who are affected by each such action when we consider it from the common point of view.

As we saw, he argues that the traits of which we approve fall into four groups: traits immediately agreeable to their possessor or to others, and traits advantageous to their possessor or to others. In these four groups of approved traits, our approval arises as the result of sympathy bringing into our minds the pleasure that the trait produces for its possessor or for others with one minor exception.

This is especially clear with such self-regarding virtues as prudence and industry, which we approve even when they occur in individuals who provide no benefit to us observers; this can only be explained by our sympathy with the benefits that prudence and industry bring to their possessors. According to Hume, different levels and manifestations of the passions of pride and humility make for virtue or for vice.

Thus the professed preference of Christians for humility over self-esteem does not accord with the judgments of most observers. Although excessive pride is a natural vice and self-esteem a natural virtue, human beings in society create the artificial virtue of good breeding adherence to customs of slightly exaggerated mutual deference in accordance with social rank to enable us each to conceal our own pride easily so that it does not shock the pride of others.

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Courage and military heroism are also forms of pride. By adopting the common point of view we correct for the distortions of sympathy by entering into the feelings of those close to the person being evaluated even if they are remote from us.

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Although natural abilities of the mind are not traditionally classified as moral virtues and vices, the difference between these types of traits is unimportant, Hume argues. Intelligence, good judgment, application, eloquence, and wit are also mental qualities that bring individuals the approbation of others, and their absence is disapproved. As is the case with many of the traditionally-recognized virtues, the various natural abilities are approved either because they are useful to their possessor or because they are immediately agreeable to others.

It is sometimes argued that moral virtues are unlike natural abilities in that the latter are involuntary, but Hume argues that many traditional moral virtues are involuntary as well. The sole difference is that the prospect of reward or punishment can induce people to act as the morally virtuous would as justice requires, for example , but cannot induce them to act as if they had the natural abilities. Late in his life Hume deemed the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals his best work, and in style it is a model of elegance and subtlety.

The conclusions largely coincide with those of the Treatise. We use reason extensively to learn the effects of various traits and to identify the useful and pernicious ones. But utility and disutility are merely means; were we indifferent to the weal and woe of mankind, we would feel equally indifferent to the traits that promote those ends. Therefore there must be some sentiment that makes us favor the one over the other. This argument presupposes that the moral evaluations we make are themselves the expression of sentiment rather than reason alone.

The alternative position would be that while of course we do feel approval and disapproval for vice and virtue, the judgment as to which is which is itself the deliverance of reason.

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So Hume appends some arguments directed against the hypothesis of moral rationalism. One of these is an enriched version of the argument of Treatise 3. He adds that while in our reasonings we start from the knowledge of relations or facts and infer some previously-unknown relation or fact, moral evaluation cannot proceed until all the relevant facts and relations are already known.

At that point, there is nothing further for reason to do; therefore moral evaluation is not the work of reason alone but of another faculty. He bolsters this line of argument by expanding his Treatise analogy between moral and aesthetic judgment, arguing that just as our appreciation of beauty awaits full information about the object but requires the further contribution of taste, so in moral evaluation our assessment of merit or villainy awaits full knowledge of the person and situation but requires the further contribution of approbation or disapprobation.

In the moral Enquiry Hume omits all arguments to show that reason alone does not move us to act; so the Representation Argument about the irrelevance of reason to passions and actions is absent. Without it he has no support for his direct argument that moral goodness and evil are not identical with reasonableness and unreasonableness, which relies on it for its key premise; and that too is absent from EPM.

On the whole in EPM Hume does not appeal to the thesis that reason cannot produce motives in order to show that morals are not derived from reason alone, but limits himself to the epistemic and descriptive arguments showing that reason alone cannot discern virtue and vice in order to reject ethical rationalism in favor of sentimentalism. However, at Appendix I. Why did Hume omit the more fundamental arguments for the motivational inertia of reason?

He may have reconsidered and rejected them. For example, he may have given up his undefended claim that passions have no representative character, a premise of the Representation Argument on which, as we saw, some of his fundamental anti-rationalist arguments depend. Or he may have retained these views but opted not to appeal to anything so arcane in a work aimed at a broader audience and intended to be as accessible as possible.

The moral Enquiry makes no use of ideas and impressions, and so no arguments that depend on that distinction can be offered there, including the Representation Argument. Apparently Hume thought he could show that reason and sentiment rule different domains without using those arguments. Thus, not surprisingly, the causal analysis of sympathy as a mechanism of vivacity-transferal from the impression of the self to the ideas of the sentiments of others is entirely omitted from the moral Enquiry.

Hume still appeals to sympathy there to explain the origin of all moral approval and disapproval, but he explains our sympathy with others simply as a manifestation of the sentiment of humanity, which is given more prominence. He is still concerned about the objection that sympathetically-acquired sentiments vary with spatial and temporal distance from the object of evaluation while moral assessments do not; so he addresses it in the moral Enquiry as well, and resolves it by appealing once again to the common point of view.

In the Enquiry he places more emphasis on sympathy with the interests of the whole of society, in part achieved by conversation using shared moral vocabulary, as a way to correct our initial sentiments to make them genuinely moral Taylor He also attends more explicitly to the role of reason and reflection in moral evaluation. Some interpreters see him as offering an account of how to arrive at reliable moral judgment superior to that in the Treatise Taylor While any explanation of this shift and these omissions is merely speculative, here it seems that Hume does not change his mind about the arguments of the Treatise but chooses to lead the reader to the same conclusions by more subtle and indirect means while avoiding provocative claims.

In the moral Enquiry Hume is more explicit about what he takes to be the errors of Christian or, more cautiously, Roman Catholic moralists. The Passions and the Will 3. The Influencing Motives of the Will 4. Ethical Anti-rationalism 5. Is and Ought 6. The Nature of Moral Judgment 7. Sympathy, and the Nature and Origin of the Moral Sentiments 8. The Common Point of View 9.

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Artificial and Natural Virtues Honesty with Respect to Property Fidelity to Promises Allegiance to Government The grade examinations, pre-primary to grade 8 are designed to deliver classical ballet technique and National Character Dance. Vocational examinations are on offer too for students moving into a more dedicated area of training with an interest. Our classes are delivered with dedicated preparation to accommodate our pupils' development. Structured classes are given. We specialise in teaching young children from three years of age with a dedicated bespoke nursery programme to cater for young ballerinas.

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When the h was first looking for a beauty therapy job, she kept in touch with her BFF from the orphanage. The BFF was two years older and her boyfriend at the time gave the h a business card and sent her to a massage clinic to get a job. The h soon figured out with her first client that the 'clinic' was a front for prostitution and as she ran out of the room after throwing things at her client, a tall, dark guy in a business suit escorted her out.

Seeing the H in a business suit for the first time makes her realize that it was the H and the h is furious that he is little better than a pimp. The h got another job at a real clinic after her experience and lost contact with her BFF, until she got a letter from the police saying her friend had died from an overdose after being into drugs and prostitution at that same clinic the h had fled from.

So the h decides she hates the H and when he shows up at his mum's, ready to put the Lurve Force Mojo moves on the h, she tells him she is a unicorn groomer and the only way he is getting any of her is if he marries her. The h doesn't for a second believe the H actually will marry her and she has pretty much given up on the revenge notion after a sleepless night. But Surprise! The H decides he wants to marry, his mum wants grandkids and he announces the engagement to his mother.

One wedding and semi-forced seduction later, the h is massively in love. Sadly she believes she is in love with a pimp and everything the H says seems to confirm that he is all about paying the ladies for some luvin'. The H tells the h she can spend all the money she wants, he just wants her in bed and an heir for his trouble. The h finally learns that the massage 'clinic' belonged to his cousin and when he died, the H sold the place off, he did not want his family name associated with such a scheme.

The H never told her this, she heard it from the H's relatives. So the h decides to try and make the marriage real, but the H is still treating her like a pay to play kind of penthouse popsie. The h gets bored living on the H's Greek Island and wants to go ahead with her beauty clinic idea, so she decides to go see the H while he is on a business trip to his main office in Athens. She gets the key to the H's apartment and finds out that the H's spa manager, who is also the evil OW, is actually living there and the woman's clothes are cohabiting with the H's. The OW tells the h that she and the H are still bed buddies and the h is hurt and furious.

She goes to the H's male assistant's place and asks him to get her out of Greece immediately. The h is soaked from running through the rain and the assistant offers her dry clothes and a shower. Then the H shows up and he immediately accuses the h of cheating on him. The h is too furious to say anything at the time, but the next morning she decides to leave the H. The H manages to intercept the h's escape and kinda kidnaps her to his yacht. There is a big fight and the h throws down on the fact that the is H shacking up with his tarty spa manager OW, when he isn't lurving it up with her.


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The H is happy she is jealous, cause it means she cares and he quickly explains that he is selling the spas and the manager will be leaving his company, but she needed a temporary place to stay while the sale went on and since the H was always with the h, he let her use his apartment. The H also figures out that the h was only at his male assistant's house so he could help her leave the H. Now that both of them mostly believe that they haven't cheated on each other, the big love declarations can begin.

Which is a good thing cause all those boudoir bouncing moments with the H have led to an upcoming stork delivery. The H does a pretty good "I love you since you knocked me on my hiney" speech and the h joyously declares her love back, we learn that the H hasn't been with anyone but the h since he met her and that his Greek Lady Mum always wanted to be an actress, so she is a very big Drama Queen. Since the h and the H are both pretty talented in that department themselves, we can be assured of a very dramatic, but probably happy future and we leave the two lurving it up for the big HEA.

This one was pretty campy and the H and h their little spats were fairly funny. The H was very bossy, but the h just does what she wants anyways, so I did not think it would be a huge issue. Mar 25, Kiki rated it did not like it Shelves: book-i-shall-never-touch-again , borderline-rape-of-spouse , can-t-believe-i-just-read-that , communication-is-the-fucking-key , doormat-heroine , hero-celibate-after-meeting-heroin , hero-is-disrespectful , is-she-a-masochist , massive-manwhore-alert , ow-makes-trouble. This one is a piece of work. When his wife tries to make their strain marriage into a normal one and shows him the clothes she bought that day he tells her she "really doesn't need to show him every piece of clothing she bought with sex" and Insinuates that she's his whore.

Also might have directly called her that too, at this point in gagging too much to care. Now, she made her fair share of mistakes, but is it REALLY too much too expect that if he's going to grovel he will apologise at some point of time for suggesting something that is bound to make people's skin crawl? Apparently, yes. And I don't think trying to kill both yourself and your wife in a suicidal boat ride can really be classified as grovelling. So nope - F minus. View 2 comments.

Oct 01, Aou rated it it was amazing Shelves: angst , cruel-hero , oldies , revenge , virgin-h. Heroine had an incredibly silly reason for revenge but I loved it. Jan 24, Roub rated it it was amazing Shelves: favorites. View all 3 comments. The angsty chemistry between the h Saffron and the H Alex was so very very hot. And although, it reminded me of Savage Surrender by Charlotte Lamb in parts; it was quite brilliant in itself. The plot was simple enough, with the h and the H trying hard to fight an irresistible attraction to one another for various reasons, including revenge and jealousy.

However, none of those so much fun!

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However, none of those reasons prevent the couple from falling in love with each other really early on, and then it's just a matter of sorting out the misunderstandings - in a very compelling manner. And I enjoyed every second! Also, there were two other things that I've realised post reading this book. Two - I seem to generally enjoy novels with Heroes named Alex or thereabouts. Here's a list 1. Alex from the Veranchetti Marriage by Lynne Graham 2. Alex from Savage Surrender by Charlotte Lamb 3.

Alexis from Response by Penny Jordan 4. Alex from Price of a Bride by Michelle Reid So if anyone knows of another worthwhile romance read with a hero called Alex, please do recommend! Feb 04, Dianna rated it really liked it. Mostly enjoyed this - I'm usually careful around Baird, because her secret baby stories make me twitchy and stressed. The heroine is sort of an idiot through the middle of this book, and the hero doesn't cope well at all. I appreciated that I noticed that he was always wearing blue. So rare for a hero to have a signature colour!

I approve. Jul 20, Leona rated it it was ok Shelves: hqn-presents. To me, this was all about their sexual attraction. I thought the author failed to build a relationship between them. From the time they got married it was all about their sex.